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appellees' argument that Sisson precluded 
an analysis of what actually occurred 
because here, unlike Sisson, maritime 
commerce was actually disrupted and thus 
such a counter-factual analysis was not 
necessary. Id. at 230 n.7 (citing Sisson, 
497 U.S. at 358 and Foremost, 457 U.S. at 
668). 
(3) Finally, the Seventh Circuit 
noted that when determining if an activity 
is "substantially related to traditional 
maritime activity," a court need only be 
"concerned with 'the general character of 
the activity."' Id. at 230 (quoting Sisson, 
497 U.S. at 365). Although one of the 
purposes of pile clusters is to protect 
bridges, the court held that the installation 
of pile clusters is related to maritime 
activity because pile clusters also protect 
ships when they collide with bridges and 
aid ships in navigation. Id. 
(b) The Limitation Act, 46 App. 
U.S.C.A § 183(a) (West 1993), is intended 
to shield owners from liability beyond their 
interest in the vessel for loss or damage 
incurred without the privity or knowledge 
of the ship owner. Great Lakes, 3 F.3d at 
230. Although the Limitation Act does not 
defme "privity or knowledge," the court 
stated that "privity or knowledge" is 
understood to be an owner's 'personal 
participation ... in the fault or negligence 
which caused or contributed to the loss or 
injury."' Id. at 231 (quoting Coryell v. 
Phipps, 317 U.S. 406, 411 (1943). The 
court further noted that a corporate 
shipowner's employees consist of two 
groups: corporate managers, who have 
discretionary authority, and ministerial 
employees. Id. (citing 3 Benedict on 
Admiralty§ 42 at 5-14 (7th rev. ed. 1991)). 
The court ruled that a corporate shipowner 
is shielded from liability for damages 
resulting from the acts of purely 
ministerial employees, but is not shielded 
from liability when a managerial employee 
personally participates in the negligent act. 
Id. (citing 3 Benedict on Admiralty § 42 at 
5-14 (7th rev. ed. 1991)). Because the 
record did not indicate whether the alleged 
negligent act was performed by a 
managerial or ministerial employee, the 
court held that the district court erred in 
dismissing Great Lakes' claim without 
making such a factual determination. Id. 
The court rejected the district court's 
reliance on Joyce v. Joyce, 975 F.2d 379 
(7th Cir. 1992), for the proposition that the 
Limitation Act, 46 App. U.S.CA § 183(a) 
(West 1993), will not limit Great Lakes' 
liability. Great Lakes, 3 F.3d at 231-32. 
The court ruled that Joyce was not 
applicable to the present case because 
Joyce involved the negligent entrustment 
of an individual rather than a corporate 
shipowner. Id. at 232. Finally, the court 
ruled that the "personal contracts doctrine" 
would not prevent Great Lakes from 
utilizing the Limitation Act, 46 App. 
U.S.CA § 183(a) (West 1993), as the 
district court ruled, because the "personal 
contracts doctrine" only applied to 
contracts and this action sounded in tort. 
Great Lakes, 3 F.3d at 232. 
John M. Kiba '94 
CERAMIC CORP. OF AMERICA V. INKA MARITIME CORP. 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, NINTH CIRCUIT 
6 AUGUST 1993 
1 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 1993) 
Japan is not an alternative forum for a judgment declaring that vessel interests 
have no right to recover general average contributions because Japan would 
automatically enforce a forum selection clause in the bill of lading and dismiss the 
action, thus providing a "clearly unsatisfactory" remedy. 
8 
, 
FACTS: The MfV Bremen Senator 
(''vessel") collided with a pier in Japanese 
territorial waters in mid May 1991, 
disrupting the vessel's trip to- the United 
States. Ceramic Corp. of America v. Inka 
Maritime Corp. , 1 F.3d 947, 948 (9th Cir. 
1993). The vessel owner, Inka Maritime 
Corp. ("Inka"), a Liberian corporation with 
its principal place of business in Germany, 
filed a general average claim against 
Ceramic Corp. of America and 22 other 
American owners and insurers of cargo 
aboard the MfV Bremen Senator 
("Ceramic"). Id. Ceramic, in turn, filed an 
action in admiralty in the United States 
District Court for the Central District of 
California against the vessel in rem, Inka, 
the vessel's manager, and the vessel's two 
charterers (collectively, "vessel interests") 
seeking money damages and a declaratory 
judgment that vessel interests had no right 
to recover general average contributions or 
contributions to any salvage award 
following the vessel's collision. Id. The 
vessel interests filed a motion to dismiss 
the action on the grounds of forum non 
conveniens. Id. The district court granted 
the motion, holding that Japan was a more 
convenient forum. I d. Ceramic appealed to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit. Ceramic, 1 F.3d at 948. 
ISSUE: Does Japan provide an adequate 
forum for the resolution of a judgment 
declaring that vessel interests have no 
right to recover general average 
contributions when Japan would 
automatically enforce a forum selection 
clause in the bill of lading and dismiss the 
suit? 
ANALYSIS: The Ninth Dircuitnoted that 
review of a trial court's dismissal on the 
grounds of forum non conveniens is limited 
to one of abuse of discretion. I d. at 948-49 
(citing Lockman Found. v. Evangelical 
Alliance Mission, 930 F.2d 764, 767 (9th 
Cir. 1991); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 
9 
U.S. 235, 257 (1981)). The circuit court 
stated that a party seeking dismissal on the 
grounds of forum non conveniens "has the 
burden of showing '(1) the existence of an 
adequate alternative forum, and (2) that 
the balance of private and public interest 
factors favors dismissal.'" I d. at 949 
(quoting Contact Lumber Co. v. P.T. Moges 
Shipping Co., 918 F.2d 1446, 1449 (9th Cir. 
1990)). The court f1rst determined 
whether Japan provided an adequate 
alternative forum. Id. The court stated 
that an alternative forum is adequate when 
the defendant is amenable to having the 
case tried in the alternative jurisdiction. Id. 
(citing Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22). 
In the present case, the district court 
conditioned the dismissal on the ground 
that the defendant would not raise a 
statute of limitations defense on any claim 
resulting from this accident flied in Japan 
within one year. Ceramic, 1 F.3d at 949. 
The circuit court ruled that this 
conditional dismissal satisfied the adequate 
alternative test. Id. 
The Ninth Circuit stated that even 
when a defendant is amenable to the 
alternative forum, there are "rare 
circumstances" in which the remedy is so 
inadequate that the forum provides no 
remedy at all. Id. (quoting Piper Aircraft, 
454 U.S. at 254 & n.22). Dismissal is not 
"appropriate 'where the alternative forum 
does not permit litigation of the subject 
matter of the dispute.'" Id. (quoting Piper 
Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22) The court 
further ruled that dismissal on forum non 
conveniens grounds may be appropriate 
even if the other jurisdiction does not 
provide all the remedies available in the 
original -court;· provided some remedy is 
available in the other jurisdiction. Id. 
(citing Lockman, 930 F.2d at 768-69). 
The court noted that Japan would 
honor a German forum selection clause in 
the bill of lading and automatically dismiss 
this case, thus preventing Ceramic from 
obtaining relief in that forum. Ceramic, 1 
F. 3d at 949. As a result, the court ruled 
that this case falls within the exception 
"where the remedy provided by the 
a l t e r n a t i v e  f o r u m  i s  ' c l e a r l y  
unsatisfactory.'" Id. at 949-50 (citing Piper 
Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254 n. 2 2). Because no 
adequate remedy existed in Japan, 
dismissal was an abuse of discretion. I d. at 
950. The vessel interests contended that 
dismissal was appropriate regardless of the 
German forum selection clause because 
Germany is an adequate forum and U.S. 
courts would have honored the forum 
selection clause anyway, thus forcing 
litigation in Germany. Id. The court did 
not decide these issues because they didn't 
pertain to whether Japan was an adequate 
forum. Id. 
Christopher McCarthy '95 
INSURANCE Co. OF NORTH AMERICA V. G.l. TRUCKING Co. 
UNITED STATES COURT OF .APPEALS, NINTH CIRCUIT 
2 AUGUST 1993 
1 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 1993) 
Ninth Circuit holds that the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") regulations, 
specifying the minimum requirements of a written claim against a carrier under the 
Uniform Bill of Lading ("UBL"), apply to both contested and uncontested claims. A 
written claim against a carrier which identifies the shipment, contains a clear 
intention to hold the carrier liable, and provides a reasonable estimate of the claim, 
but does not specify a dollar amount, is legally sufficient under the ICC replations, 
outlining the minimum requirements of the UBL. 
FACTS: The G.I. Trucking Company 
("G.I.") transported a shipment of 
intraocular lenses for Eye Technology, Inc. 
("Eye Tech") from Los Angeles to Calexico, 
Ca., on April 19, 1988. Insurance Co. of 
North America v. G.I. Trucking Co., 1 F. 3d 
903, 904 (9th Cir. 199 3). The shipment 
was damaged. Id. Eye Tech's insurer, 
Insurance Company of North America 
("INA"), compensated Eye Tech and became 
the subrogee of Eye Tech's claim against 
G.l. Id. On December 2, 1988, INA's 
subrogation unit, Recovery Services, 
International ("RSI"), sent G.I. a written 
notice of damage which identified the 
shipment, communicated an intent to hold 
G. l. liable and pmvided an· estimate of 
$ 100,000 in damages to the lenses. Id. INA 
paid Eye Tech $97,500 on March 3, 1989. 
Id. On March 27, 1989, RSI sent G. l. a 
"Standard Form for Presentation of Loss" 
in the amount of $ 100,000, but G.l. denied 
10 
liability and refused to pay. Insurance Co. , 
1 F.3d at 904-05. 
INA filed a claim against G.l. for 
carrier liability and negligence in California 
State court. Id. at 905. G.I. denied the 
claims, removed the suit to federal district 
court, and filed a motion for summary 
judgement, asserting that INA failed to file 
a written claim within the nine month 
period required by the ICC regulations. Id. 
The United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California granted the 
motion holding that INA's December 2nd 
notice of claim was for an "uncertain 
amount" and was not considered a legally 
sufficient claim within the requirements of 
the ICC regulations. Id. INA appealed to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit. Id. 
ISSUES: (a) Do the ICC regulations, 
